Iraq Strategy
Jan. 5th, 2007 11:14 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
danalwynIn honor of the 110th Congress, I will attempt to do something that the Democrats so far have been unable to do, namely coming up with a strategy for Iraq.
A strategy for Iraq is very simple from a military perspective. Unfortunately for them (but probably fortunately for the rest of us), in the US, politics trumps military needs, and the court of public opinion will simply not tolerate several convenient plans. Because of this, it seems that we are trapped in a situation that is probably, at best, just going to cost us a few thousand lives while we wait for a politically convenient time to bail out.
But in this country, the people's elected representatives tell us what to do, and we get down and do it. So, even though everything in me tells me that this strategy is going to fail, I've done my best to try and come up with something politically acceptable that might stand a chance of working.
Not that any of you care really. But, hey, at least somebody wrote something down.
To understand the problem, you have to understand that the Democrats are being asked to create a strategy from a losing premise. Everyone, from al-Maliki, to James Baker, to Kim Jong Il, think that Iraq is currently spiraling into disaster. If we want to turn this around, we will have to act decisively to change the direction of the war, to change our entire approach in certain sectors, and re-evaluate our past mistakes. The American public, however, is entering Super Bowl season, and quite frankly just doesn't want to be bothered by this sort of stuff. As a result, we're stuck in a holding pattern, and are rapidly running out of fuel.
The first hurdle will be American public opinion. Many Americans, especially influential Americans, do not want to just “Cut and Run”. They see this as a wound to America's pride that will cause the country to suffer, both internally and internationally. They want to avoid a repeat of their version of Vietnam, in which everything that went bad after Vietnam can be blamed on us running away (including, apparently, the oil crisis of the late 70s). On the other hand, they are not willing to put forth the effort to actually Win. If America increased its troop strength in Iraq from 100,000 to 10,000,000 (still less than the size of the army in World War II), and maintained them there for ten to twenty years, we could probably restore order to the streets, disarm the militias, and generally make good on our promises. The side effects would be a return of the draft, an increase in taxes, and probably a crippling of the US economy that could last several decades. Americans are determined to do what it takes in Iraq, as long as it doesn't actually inconvenience them.
The second hurdle is the Pentagon itself. If the US decides that winning the war is important, that will mean reshaping the US Armed Forces to fight a counter-insurgency war instead of a conventional one. This will cut a lot of equipment and support programs out of the Pentagon, turn the entire structure of the army on its head, and seriously offend both the Air Force and the Navy. The Democratic ship of state may have a strong mandate, but DoD bureaucracy is a damn big iceberg, and quite frankly I was not so enamored of Titanic that I want to see the whole affair played out again.
That being said, we can neither leave (the easiest option), nor massively deploy (the most advantageous option – if Iraq alone is being considered). Neither, however, can we afford to stay there indefinitely. Any strategy has to take into account all of these factors.
So what then is our goal? Our original goal has already fallen out of sight. Our current goal seems to be to leave something, anything, stable in Iraq. There are hints that this may even be too high to aim for, and we may have to settle for simply getting our troops our before a civil war starts.
Assuming that we want something stable in Iraq, there are two ways to do it. We can either support an existing power, or we can try to create our own. Currently, we have opted for option number two, trying to create a secular, centralized, democratic government. So far, this has not worked, simply because internal power struggles tear it apart faster than we can put it together. Conversely, trying to support one of the existing power blocks is also a no-go. Not only are they highly fragmented themselves, but they are politically unsuitable. In a country where a party's political power is measured in AK-47s, the strongest militant parties have foreign connections we find disturbing. The largest Shi'a blocks are too closely allied with Iran to appeal to us. At the same time, the Sunni blocks seem to either be associated with Saddam Hussein, or with al-Qaeda, two groups who we find equally unpalatable.
So what's left?
The US has two options, neither of which seem particularly good. One is to start over with our attempt to create a secular government. The other is to apply traditional counter-insurgency techniques, and slowly establish our control over the country with the “oil-stain” method.
In the first option, which is essentially Staying the Course, the US would have to retrain a great number of their own troops, teaching them to be counter-insurgency fighters rather than conventional warriors. At the same time, there would have to be a simultaneous push to change the Iraqi army, the Iraqi government, and the minds of the Iraqi people. This would have to be accompanied by a strong diplomatic push to reduce the destabilizing influences. It would also involve transforming the Iraqi government into a much fairer, less corrupt, edifice that is capable of inspiring leadership in its people. This has about as much of a chance as lasting as a snowball does in Baghdad, but it is possibly our only chance.
Unfortunately, the other option is even more unpalatable. It involves abandoning most of Iraq to chaos and concentrating our forces in a small sector. As the rest of the country fights a civil war, we can slowly expand our coverage, creating an efficient, locally representative government, and an enclave in which prosperity flourishes. As the rest of the country exhausts itself past their ability to resist in internecine fighting, we can expand our zone at the same pace, until a responsible country controls most of the nation. This will result in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths and, even worse, probably get the neighbors involved in an attempt to keep things quiet.
So, trapped by politics, we end up staying the course. Not that this will probably do us much good. I do not seriously believe that we can overcome the inertia of the entrenched Pentagon, the political stalemate in Washington, and the lethargy of the American people to be of any use to the people of Iraq. More likely, another couple of thousand Americans will die before we finally get tired of paying for the funerals and call the boys back home, after which the Iraqis can go out and kill each other much more efficiently.
But this is not a general's job to worry about. We have been giving our marching orders by the public. Now we need to do something about them. In regards to this, I propose the following points as the framework for a Democratic strategy, in the almost certain knowledge that nobody will be able to carry it through, but knowing that I have to try anyway.
1)Expand the US Army by 10-20,000 men. This will, despite the number of people suggesting it, not be an easy task. The willing manpower pool is almost swamped. Most likely, the easiest way to do this is either to increase recruiting bonuses to astronomical levels, reduce standards, and possibly recruit long-term illegal immigrants with promises of citizenship. If worse comes to worse, we can begin recruiting from the US's large jail population.
2)Integrate these troops in existing units while they are on a quiet rotation. This would reduce the problems of starting a completely green unit. It would also free up troops for part 4.
3)Change the deployment schedule to more properly break up Iraq. Brigades on their second and third deployment should return to the areas they were previously, where they already have contacts and experience. This would reduce the time it takes for a brigade to get started, and increase coordination between units in Iraq, and those recuperating stateside.
4)Draw veteran units from existing combat brigades to create a new brigade specifically geared toward counter-insurgency warfare. This would be a much less expensive venture than creating a standard infantry brigade. Counter-insurgency warfare does not involve heavy armored vehicles, anti-tank helicopters, or artillery support. It will, however, involve mandatory lessons in Arabic and Iraqi customs, law-enforcement training, and emphasis of the values of the DoD's new counter-insurgency policies.
5)Send police advisors into Iraq in larger numbers to help train the Iraqi police force. Not military advisors pretending to be police, but police hired on recommendation from some of the US's tougher neighborhoods (offer serious bonuses to officers from inner-city US precincts). This is unlikely to help, but it can't hurt to try at this point.
6)Create a special civilian unit dedicated to rooting out corruption. Staff it well, fund it independently, and give it the power to investigate both Iraqi and US companies. Also set it to looking for evidence of bribery in the Iraqi government, and pushing the court system to tackle cases. In Iraq it seems that finding a person who is not taking bribes is a rarity, so this group will have to start small and work their way up the food chain. Trying to topple half the government from the start will doom the effort. But it's important not to give up. We came to accept the rampant corruption in Vietnam, which might be one of the reasons why Thieu's government was absolutely ineffectual.
7)Speaking of civilian units, fire all the civilian military contractors. The mercenaries may be useful, but if we're not going to police them correctly (and so far we aren't), then they're doing more harm than good by being there. It might serve as a potential recruiting ground for more US troops anyway, but it's damn hard to plot a strategy when some of our forces are not under our control.
8)Reform the way in which we pay Iraqi contractors. Work out a system at which pay is distributed at set intervals in exchange for work completed. Too many projects are done in a slipshod manner, because prices have been inflated. Also set up a system to reward contractors who do good work with more contracts. Police this system often, as corruption is sure to sink in. Doing this could improve the efficiency of the money we pour into Iraq by a factor of ten.
9)Allow promising Iraqi officers to “embed” in American units more often. Rather than having advisors try to show them how to do things, have them see for themselves. There have been several promising steps in this direction, but it's time to be more thorough and systematic about it.
10) Begin open, and highly public, negotiations with both insurgent groups and local militias. If you can make one group become rich and successful by negotiating with the US, there will be more opportunity to negotiate with others. This is unlikely to work, but it will give you a better idea of the lay of the land, make it appear that you are trying to hasten peace, and let you keep tabs on the opposition.
11) Create a discreet law enforcement corps to investigate civilian complaints about the behavior of both Iraqi and US forces without attracting undue attention. This is ideally to allow anonymous complaints to remain essentially anonymous, freeing informants from worrying about mafia-style retaliation. This will require highly trained people familiar with Iraqi culture, and may one day turn into an anti-corruption force in its own right.
12) Put an emphasis on basic services. Restoring water service to Baghdad and environs would actually lessen the load on US logistics. Electrical power plants could possibly be constructed on US bases and run by US personnel. Not only would this make people's lives better and increase their contentment, but it would give you a concrete accomplishment, and make the Iraqi government something to be proud of rather than contemptuous of.
13) Open more formal talks with both Iran and Syria. Both countries will be vital to the future of Iraq, and both countries, even though they are winning, may decide to be amenable. Counterbalance this with Saudi Arabia's threat to intervene on behalf of Sunnis, just to make life more interesting, and hopefully force all sides to the table (don't ask about the worst case scenario).
14) Restrict all air and artillery operations. We would not appreciate it if police in our town called in air strikes to root out a thug, and the Iraqis do not exactly appreciate it when we do it there. If we're going to fight, we'll have to do it hand to hand, regardless of the casualties.
15) Remember, the primary objective here is to protect Iraqi civilians, not just from “insurgents” and “militias”, but also from criminal gangs and all manner of thugs. Despite the fact that they are neither trained nor equipped for the job, we are going to have to use American troops as police. Not only do you have to work with Iraqi civilians to provide for their needs, but you also have to keep them safe. The one who manages to do that is the one who wins the “war”.
Will this work? I'm doubtful, and it's my strategy. The problem is simply time and money. The US simply does not have the patience or the budget to pay for this. I know the optomists are saying that with the proper approach we could be out in as little as ten years, but a plan like this may take decades, and the US simply does not have the patience to keep dealing with this year after year. Besides, this also demands a lot of cooperation from the Iraqi government which, unfortunately, it is not in their interests to give. And it depends on no large changes to the situation.
So in the end, I would say we're basically screwed. But I can always hold out hope, can't I?
A strategy for Iraq is very simple from a military perspective. Unfortunately for them (but probably fortunately for the rest of us), in the US, politics trumps military needs, and the court of public opinion will simply not tolerate several convenient plans. Because of this, it seems that we are trapped in a situation that is probably, at best, just going to cost us a few thousand lives while we wait for a politically convenient time to bail out.
But in this country, the people's elected representatives tell us what to do, and we get down and do it. So, even though everything in me tells me that this strategy is going to fail, I've done my best to try and come up with something politically acceptable that might stand a chance of working.
Not that any of you care really. But, hey, at least somebody wrote something down.
To understand the problem, you have to understand that the Democrats are being asked to create a strategy from a losing premise. Everyone, from al-Maliki, to James Baker, to Kim Jong Il, think that Iraq is currently spiraling into disaster. If we want to turn this around, we will have to act decisively to change the direction of the war, to change our entire approach in certain sectors, and re-evaluate our past mistakes. The American public, however, is entering Super Bowl season, and quite frankly just doesn't want to be bothered by this sort of stuff. As a result, we're stuck in a holding pattern, and are rapidly running out of fuel.
The first hurdle will be American public opinion. Many Americans, especially influential Americans, do not want to just “Cut and Run”. They see this as a wound to America's pride that will cause the country to suffer, both internally and internationally. They want to avoid a repeat of their version of Vietnam, in which everything that went bad after Vietnam can be blamed on us running away (including, apparently, the oil crisis of the late 70s). On the other hand, they are not willing to put forth the effort to actually Win. If America increased its troop strength in Iraq from 100,000 to 10,000,000 (still less than the size of the army in World War II), and maintained them there for ten to twenty years, we could probably restore order to the streets, disarm the militias, and generally make good on our promises. The side effects would be a return of the draft, an increase in taxes, and probably a crippling of the US economy that could last several decades. Americans are determined to do what it takes in Iraq, as long as it doesn't actually inconvenience them.
The second hurdle is the Pentagon itself. If the US decides that winning the war is important, that will mean reshaping the US Armed Forces to fight a counter-insurgency war instead of a conventional one. This will cut a lot of equipment and support programs out of the Pentagon, turn the entire structure of the army on its head, and seriously offend both the Air Force and the Navy. The Democratic ship of state may have a strong mandate, but DoD bureaucracy is a damn big iceberg, and quite frankly I was not so enamored of Titanic that I want to see the whole affair played out again.
That being said, we can neither leave (the easiest option), nor massively deploy (the most advantageous option – if Iraq alone is being considered). Neither, however, can we afford to stay there indefinitely. Any strategy has to take into account all of these factors.
So what then is our goal? Our original goal has already fallen out of sight. Our current goal seems to be to leave something, anything, stable in Iraq. There are hints that this may even be too high to aim for, and we may have to settle for simply getting our troops our before a civil war starts.
Assuming that we want something stable in Iraq, there are two ways to do it. We can either support an existing power, or we can try to create our own. Currently, we have opted for option number two, trying to create a secular, centralized, democratic government. So far, this has not worked, simply because internal power struggles tear it apart faster than we can put it together. Conversely, trying to support one of the existing power blocks is also a no-go. Not only are they highly fragmented themselves, but they are politically unsuitable. In a country where a party's political power is measured in AK-47s, the strongest militant parties have foreign connections we find disturbing. The largest Shi'a blocks are too closely allied with Iran to appeal to us. At the same time, the Sunni blocks seem to either be associated with Saddam Hussein, or with al-Qaeda, two groups who we find equally unpalatable.
So what's left?
The US has two options, neither of which seem particularly good. One is to start over with our attempt to create a secular government. The other is to apply traditional counter-insurgency techniques, and slowly establish our control over the country with the “oil-stain” method.
In the first option, which is essentially Staying the Course, the US would have to retrain a great number of their own troops, teaching them to be counter-insurgency fighters rather than conventional warriors. At the same time, there would have to be a simultaneous push to change the Iraqi army, the Iraqi government, and the minds of the Iraqi people. This would have to be accompanied by a strong diplomatic push to reduce the destabilizing influences. It would also involve transforming the Iraqi government into a much fairer, less corrupt, edifice that is capable of inspiring leadership in its people. This has about as much of a chance as lasting as a snowball does in Baghdad, but it is possibly our only chance.
Unfortunately, the other option is even more unpalatable. It involves abandoning most of Iraq to chaos and concentrating our forces in a small sector. As the rest of the country fights a civil war, we can slowly expand our coverage, creating an efficient, locally representative government, and an enclave in which prosperity flourishes. As the rest of the country exhausts itself past their ability to resist in internecine fighting, we can expand our zone at the same pace, until a responsible country controls most of the nation. This will result in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths and, even worse, probably get the neighbors involved in an attempt to keep things quiet.
So, trapped by politics, we end up staying the course. Not that this will probably do us much good. I do not seriously believe that we can overcome the inertia of the entrenched Pentagon, the political stalemate in Washington, and the lethargy of the American people to be of any use to the people of Iraq. More likely, another couple of thousand Americans will die before we finally get tired of paying for the funerals and call the boys back home, after which the Iraqis can go out and kill each other much more efficiently.
But this is not a general's job to worry about. We have been giving our marching orders by the public. Now we need to do something about them. In regards to this, I propose the following points as the framework for a Democratic strategy, in the almost certain knowledge that nobody will be able to carry it through, but knowing that I have to try anyway.
1)Expand the US Army by 10-20,000 men. This will, despite the number of people suggesting it, not be an easy task. The willing manpower pool is almost swamped. Most likely, the easiest way to do this is either to increase recruiting bonuses to astronomical levels, reduce standards, and possibly recruit long-term illegal immigrants with promises of citizenship. If worse comes to worse, we can begin recruiting from the US's large jail population.
2)Integrate these troops in existing units while they are on a quiet rotation. This would reduce the problems of starting a completely green unit. It would also free up troops for part 4.
3)Change the deployment schedule to more properly break up Iraq. Brigades on their second and third deployment should return to the areas they were previously, where they already have contacts and experience. This would reduce the time it takes for a brigade to get started, and increase coordination between units in Iraq, and those recuperating stateside.
4)Draw veteran units from existing combat brigades to create a new brigade specifically geared toward counter-insurgency warfare. This would be a much less expensive venture than creating a standard infantry brigade. Counter-insurgency warfare does not involve heavy armored vehicles, anti-tank helicopters, or artillery support. It will, however, involve mandatory lessons in Arabic and Iraqi customs, law-enforcement training, and emphasis of the values of the DoD's new counter-insurgency policies.
5)Send police advisors into Iraq in larger numbers to help train the Iraqi police force. Not military advisors pretending to be police, but police hired on recommendation from some of the US's tougher neighborhoods (offer serious bonuses to officers from inner-city US precincts). This is unlikely to help, but it can't hurt to try at this point.
6)Create a special civilian unit dedicated to rooting out corruption. Staff it well, fund it independently, and give it the power to investigate both Iraqi and US companies. Also set it to looking for evidence of bribery in the Iraqi government, and pushing the court system to tackle cases. In Iraq it seems that finding a person who is not taking bribes is a rarity, so this group will have to start small and work their way up the food chain. Trying to topple half the government from the start will doom the effort. But it's important not to give up. We came to accept the rampant corruption in Vietnam, which might be one of the reasons why Thieu's government was absolutely ineffectual.
7)Speaking of civilian units, fire all the civilian military contractors. The mercenaries may be useful, but if we're not going to police them correctly (and so far we aren't), then they're doing more harm than good by being there. It might serve as a potential recruiting ground for more US troops anyway, but it's damn hard to plot a strategy when some of our forces are not under our control.
8)Reform the way in which we pay Iraqi contractors. Work out a system at which pay is distributed at set intervals in exchange for work completed. Too many projects are done in a slipshod manner, because prices have been inflated. Also set up a system to reward contractors who do good work with more contracts. Police this system often, as corruption is sure to sink in. Doing this could improve the efficiency of the money we pour into Iraq by a factor of ten.
9)Allow promising Iraqi officers to “embed” in American units more often. Rather than having advisors try to show them how to do things, have them see for themselves. There have been several promising steps in this direction, but it's time to be more thorough and systematic about it.
10) Begin open, and highly public, negotiations with both insurgent groups and local militias. If you can make one group become rich and successful by negotiating with the US, there will be more opportunity to negotiate with others. This is unlikely to work, but it will give you a better idea of the lay of the land, make it appear that you are trying to hasten peace, and let you keep tabs on the opposition.
11) Create a discreet law enforcement corps to investigate civilian complaints about the behavior of both Iraqi and US forces without attracting undue attention. This is ideally to allow anonymous complaints to remain essentially anonymous, freeing informants from worrying about mafia-style retaliation. This will require highly trained people familiar with Iraqi culture, and may one day turn into an anti-corruption force in its own right.
12) Put an emphasis on basic services. Restoring water service to Baghdad and environs would actually lessen the load on US logistics. Electrical power plants could possibly be constructed on US bases and run by US personnel. Not only would this make people's lives better and increase their contentment, but it would give you a concrete accomplishment, and make the Iraqi government something to be proud of rather than contemptuous of.
13) Open more formal talks with both Iran and Syria. Both countries will be vital to the future of Iraq, and both countries, even though they are winning, may decide to be amenable. Counterbalance this with Saudi Arabia's threat to intervene on behalf of Sunnis, just to make life more interesting, and hopefully force all sides to the table (don't ask about the worst case scenario).
14) Restrict all air and artillery operations. We would not appreciate it if police in our town called in air strikes to root out a thug, and the Iraqis do not exactly appreciate it when we do it there. If we're going to fight, we'll have to do it hand to hand, regardless of the casualties.
15) Remember, the primary objective here is to protect Iraqi civilians, not just from “insurgents” and “militias”, but also from criminal gangs and all manner of thugs. Despite the fact that they are neither trained nor equipped for the job, we are going to have to use American troops as police. Not only do you have to work with Iraqi civilians to provide for their needs, but you also have to keep them safe. The one who manages to do that is the one who wins the “war”.
Will this work? I'm doubtful, and it's my strategy. The problem is simply time and money. The US simply does not have the patience or the budget to pay for this. I know the optomists are saying that with the proper approach we could be out in as little as ten years, but a plan like this may take decades, and the US simply does not have the patience to keep dealing with this year after year. Besides, this also demands a lot of cooperation from the Iraqi government which, unfortunately, it is not in their interests to give. And it depends on no large changes to the situation.
So in the end, I would say we're basically screwed. But I can always hold out hope, can't I?