Gaddafi Gets Down to Business
Mar. 10th, 2011 10:07 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
danalwynMore Libya, because that's what I'm watching these days.
Looks like the war in Libya has finally started in earnest. No sooner had I sat down to pen about how things really did not seem to be starting (leading to some puzzled head-scratching on the behalf of international observers) and things kick off. Supporters of Gaddafi (whom I shall refer to as loyalists) have finally launched a massive attack on Ras Lunaf, apparently driving the rebels from the city (I refer to them as rebels because I find opposition members to be too unwieldy; we need a better word for that). This could signal the start of a major shift in the war in Libya, or it could be the last gasp of Gaddafi's loyalists in the face of popular revolt. One thing is pretty sure, in ten years or so we'll all be sitting around saying, “Oh yes, it should have been obvious that things would turn out this way”. Of course, it isn't. It never is.
Gaddafi's Game Plan
Gaddafi has an ally in force, and an enemy in time. Due to his paranoia, not only about the West but about his own people turning against him, he has long kept the majority of his military hardware out of the hands of potential foes, keeping it safe in warehouses and army bases in the western part of the country. This means that despite the rebels seizing half the country he still has the majority of the military equipment, including apparently all of its operational aircraft. He also appears to retain control over the most powerful and best trained of the formations of the Libyan Army.
But outside of his elite units, morale appears to be low. Those who are familiar with accounts of modern war (especially the performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam) will recognize a familiar style. Offensive operations only succeed if enough artillery, firepower, and air support is brought to bear that the opposition breaks and runs before contact is made. Otherwise they fail. Defending on their own, soldiers are often put to flight.
Gaddafi has the reserves of artillery and airpower to support large-scale offensives. He has the ability to bombard towns heavily for days before attacking them. More importantly he has tracked armored vehicles, like tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) that can cross the desert. This means that unlike the rebels, who depend on civilian transport, and thus asphalt or hard dirt roads, his forces can cut through the desert and appear suddenly on the rebels's flank. This lends itself to a very simple form of offensive warfare. Upon encountering a rebel town, loyalists will bring infantry into the edge of firing range where they can exchange potshots with the town's defenders, and then back them with a massive artillery barrage. After battering the defenders for a while, the armored column will swing out around the town, aiming to cut off any retreat. Dazed by hours of continual pounding, panicked by the sight of tanks in their rear the rebels will probably either try to retreat (losing heavily along the way), or surrender.
Gaddafi's biggest weakness then becomes time. Every hour spent bombarding rebel positions means hundreds of shells and rockets, every hour his planes spend in the air or his tanks spend moving means fuel. Artillery pieces, rocket launchers, tanks, IFVs, helicopters and airplanes are all machines, they wear out, they require maintenance and spare parts, and while Gaddafi has spare parts it looks like no more will be coming. Mercenaries and soldiers also cost money, and he may have no more of that either. His advantage in military hardware and that advantage, while impressive, is finite. It's a coin that you spend, and he's only got so much before he goes bankrupt.
Gaddafi has passed the first test. He's hung on long enough that the rebels haven't been able to unseat him before he could organize forces to fight back. Now he has to win and win quickly, because a long civil war will leave him destitute, and increase the possibility that his own army will unseat him.
Viva la Revolution!
The rebels have two allies in time and public opinion. They have two enemies, in logistics and in themselves.
Logistics, so far, has been the biggest headache. In their rush to connect with the battered rebel outposts in Misurata and Az Zawayah, the rebels have been on the offensive, and being on the offensive has a tremendous logistical burden. According to Google, it's about 360 km from Benghazi to the front line at Ras Lunaf, and 800 km to Misurata. Because they lack heavy transport, a lot of the movement seems to be in civilian vehicles, trucks, cars, vans, that sort of thing. Imagine the logistical cost of moving even a hundred people by motorcade 360 km, the amount of fuel that you would need. Add to that the cost of transporting food and ammunition from supply centers around Benghazi to the front, and you have some idea of the logistical nightmare that is being handle by impromptu effort.
Another part of logistics is military equipment – the rebels have very little. They don't have the fuel reserves to keep the drive going. They don't have the food. But especially they lack the heavy trucks and mobile weapon systems of the Libyan Army. On the defensive they may play better, after all now they don't have to race to keep up with themselves, but at the same time they may not.
But their biggest problem is themselves. The rebels have a people's army, and war is one of those things you have to train at. The biggest enemy of an impromptu army like this is inexperience, and inexperience kills.
You can see it in the way that they move when on camera, the epidemic of firing into the air whenever an al-Jazeera camera is in the neighborhood. It is a fact of simple mathematics that every bullet that you fire in the air is one that you won't have to fire at the enemy, but despite the tenuousness of their logistical chain, celebratory gunfire continues. You can see it in the continual circus of cars around rebel positions, burning up fuel that the rebels don't have. You can see it in the way that rebel anti-aircraft guns open fire at everything and anything, even when those guns are the only heavy weapons they have. And you may not be able to see it but you can read it in their moves.
Artillery is terrifying. Artillery is the most lethal part of the modern battlefield. To face an enemy with artillery superiority is to face an enemy who can reach out and kill you without every appearing, without every giving you something to fire back at. But artillery, while extremely lethal, is not as lethal as you might think from being on the battlefield. The most lethal part of artillery is the shrapnel and blast from the explosion, and the best way to avoid that is to simply dig yourself into the ground, which is why every since World War I, a shovel has been one of a soldier's most valuable pieces of equipment. Even the heartiest, best disciplined unit in the world will eventually break under continual artillery fire, but it takes time. It also takes experience, and that is the quality that the rebels lack.
The rebels are hurt by their lack of organization, by their inability to coordinate. Rebel thrusts that meet opposition seem to get bogged down. Nobody seems to be in charge to execute the fire and maneuver plans so beloved of America's Keep It Simple, Stupid school of philosophy. Groups of rebels race around aimlessly. Reinforcements group together and set out on their own, or sometimes not at all. Out of thousands of rebel fighters (with reports of more showing up all the time), only a few hundred ever seem to be at the crucial points, and nobody knows where the rest are.
Additionally the rebels are being hurt by their inability to use what they have. We know that they have captured artillery pieces of their own, including what appeared to be on first examination a towed 107mm rocket launcher. But using artillery takes practice and training, as well as continual communication with some sort of forward observer to make it effective. The employment of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) launchers, is even harder, requiring not only trained missile operators, but trained radar operators as well. We know that the rebels have taken SAM positions in eastern Libya, SAMs that would be effective at virtually grounding Gaddafi's Air Force, and we can only speculate that they lack the trained personnel to use them.
In their favor, the rebel column is sort of slim. World public opinion is on their side, but so far this has failed to provide tangible benefits. It might prevent wholesale slaughter of Benghazi for fear of western retaliation, but it has not yet provided a single bomb, a single plane, or a single tank to their cause. Their hope will be to leverage it into full-scale aid, or at least to hamper Gaddafi's high-tech advantage.
More importantly for the rebels is time. They need to hang on. Every day they hang on their soldiers learn a little, they learn how to survive air raids, how to conserve ammunition, when to fire at enemies and when not to. By process of attrition they learn the best ways to move to avoid snipers, and the best ways to survive artillery barrages. They began to develop command structures, capable of massing reserve units to prevent breakthroughs, or maintaining order in the chaos. In the street of Tobruk and Benghazi they buy time for more recruits to train, to learn how to fire rifles, how to maneuver under fire. Every hour of valuable experience turns the rebel army into something closer to the real thing. It's an incredibly valuable advantage to have, because each hour you can buy means that the next hour you buy will be cheaper.
Additionally, time gives them the chance to make use of their diplomatic advantage. The longer they can hold out, the more they can look like a real government. The more the chance they can use any oil facilities in their control (especially if they hang onto Brega) to sell oil for money, and then find some way to exchange money for more weapons. The more time they have to establish the popular base of support they'll need to take the war to its end. If they can just hang on long enough, Gaddafi will have to accept stalemate.
Or that's the hope. It remains to be seen if they have the time.
The World Watches
That's about all it does. Russia's already threatened to veto a No-Fly Zone in the UN Security Council. China hasn't decided yet. The Arab League and the African Union haven't come up with any plans that are more then fanciful fairy tales. And nobody in NATO seems eager to pony up the billion dollars that such an operation would cost.
One shouldn't beat around the bush here either. Only the loyalists have planes. Creating a no-fly zone is tantamount to declaring war on Gaddafi. I'm not saying that's a bad idea (although I don't think it's a good idea – yet), but people shouldn't delude themselves into thinking of this as a “peaceful” operation. Shooting down Libyan planes over Libyan territory (in a civil war, both sides can be said to represent Libya) is an act of war, and coming in on the side of the rebels will have consequences.
It also can't be said that this will have a decisive effect. Gaddafi would still be left with his artillery, with his tanks, and in some plans, with his helicopters (low-flying aircraft are difficult to detect). If we want to ensure a rebel victory (or at the least, rebel survival) this means sending troops in on the ground. It could be something light, like the US operations in Afghanistan that overthrew the Taliban, but it is a very real commitment. And with nobody having any idea of who would replace Gaddafi, it remains an operation the US does not with to undertake.
Nero fiddled while Rome burned. We at least have the decency not to fiddle, but the side effect is the same, while we try to figure out who is on fire, and who were the arsonists.
Looks like the war in Libya has finally started in earnest. No sooner had I sat down to pen about how things really did not seem to be starting (leading to some puzzled head-scratching on the behalf of international observers) and things kick off. Supporters of Gaddafi (whom I shall refer to as loyalists) have finally launched a massive attack on Ras Lunaf, apparently driving the rebels from the city (I refer to them as rebels because I find opposition members to be too unwieldy; we need a better word for that). This could signal the start of a major shift in the war in Libya, or it could be the last gasp of Gaddafi's loyalists in the face of popular revolt. One thing is pretty sure, in ten years or so we'll all be sitting around saying, “Oh yes, it should have been obvious that things would turn out this way”. Of course, it isn't. It never is.
Gaddafi's Game Plan
Gaddafi has an ally in force, and an enemy in time. Due to his paranoia, not only about the West but about his own people turning against him, he has long kept the majority of his military hardware out of the hands of potential foes, keeping it safe in warehouses and army bases in the western part of the country. This means that despite the rebels seizing half the country he still has the majority of the military equipment, including apparently all of its operational aircraft. He also appears to retain control over the most powerful and best trained of the formations of the Libyan Army.
But outside of his elite units, morale appears to be low. Those who are familiar with accounts of modern war (especially the performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam) will recognize a familiar style. Offensive operations only succeed if enough artillery, firepower, and air support is brought to bear that the opposition breaks and runs before contact is made. Otherwise they fail. Defending on their own, soldiers are often put to flight.
Gaddafi has the reserves of artillery and airpower to support large-scale offensives. He has the ability to bombard towns heavily for days before attacking them. More importantly he has tracked armored vehicles, like tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) that can cross the desert. This means that unlike the rebels, who depend on civilian transport, and thus asphalt or hard dirt roads, his forces can cut through the desert and appear suddenly on the rebels's flank. This lends itself to a very simple form of offensive warfare. Upon encountering a rebel town, loyalists will bring infantry into the edge of firing range where they can exchange potshots with the town's defenders, and then back them with a massive artillery barrage. After battering the defenders for a while, the armored column will swing out around the town, aiming to cut off any retreat. Dazed by hours of continual pounding, panicked by the sight of tanks in their rear the rebels will probably either try to retreat (losing heavily along the way), or surrender.
Gaddafi's biggest weakness then becomes time. Every hour spent bombarding rebel positions means hundreds of shells and rockets, every hour his planes spend in the air or his tanks spend moving means fuel. Artillery pieces, rocket launchers, tanks, IFVs, helicopters and airplanes are all machines, they wear out, they require maintenance and spare parts, and while Gaddafi has spare parts it looks like no more will be coming. Mercenaries and soldiers also cost money, and he may have no more of that either. His advantage in military hardware and that advantage, while impressive, is finite. It's a coin that you spend, and he's only got so much before he goes bankrupt.
Gaddafi has passed the first test. He's hung on long enough that the rebels haven't been able to unseat him before he could organize forces to fight back. Now he has to win and win quickly, because a long civil war will leave him destitute, and increase the possibility that his own army will unseat him.
Viva la Revolution!
The rebels have two allies in time and public opinion. They have two enemies, in logistics and in themselves.
Logistics, so far, has been the biggest headache. In their rush to connect with the battered rebel outposts in Misurata and Az Zawayah, the rebels have been on the offensive, and being on the offensive has a tremendous logistical burden. According to Google, it's about 360 km from Benghazi to the front line at Ras Lunaf, and 800 km to Misurata. Because they lack heavy transport, a lot of the movement seems to be in civilian vehicles, trucks, cars, vans, that sort of thing. Imagine the logistical cost of moving even a hundred people by motorcade 360 km, the amount of fuel that you would need. Add to that the cost of transporting food and ammunition from supply centers around Benghazi to the front, and you have some idea of the logistical nightmare that is being handle by impromptu effort.
Another part of logistics is military equipment – the rebels have very little. They don't have the fuel reserves to keep the drive going. They don't have the food. But especially they lack the heavy trucks and mobile weapon systems of the Libyan Army. On the defensive they may play better, after all now they don't have to race to keep up with themselves, but at the same time they may not.
But their biggest problem is themselves. The rebels have a people's army, and war is one of those things you have to train at. The biggest enemy of an impromptu army like this is inexperience, and inexperience kills.
You can see it in the way that they move when on camera, the epidemic of firing into the air whenever an al-Jazeera camera is in the neighborhood. It is a fact of simple mathematics that every bullet that you fire in the air is one that you won't have to fire at the enemy, but despite the tenuousness of their logistical chain, celebratory gunfire continues. You can see it in the continual circus of cars around rebel positions, burning up fuel that the rebels don't have. You can see it in the way that rebel anti-aircraft guns open fire at everything and anything, even when those guns are the only heavy weapons they have. And you may not be able to see it but you can read it in their moves.
Artillery is terrifying. Artillery is the most lethal part of the modern battlefield. To face an enemy with artillery superiority is to face an enemy who can reach out and kill you without every appearing, without every giving you something to fire back at. But artillery, while extremely lethal, is not as lethal as you might think from being on the battlefield. The most lethal part of artillery is the shrapnel and blast from the explosion, and the best way to avoid that is to simply dig yourself into the ground, which is why every since World War I, a shovel has been one of a soldier's most valuable pieces of equipment. Even the heartiest, best disciplined unit in the world will eventually break under continual artillery fire, but it takes time. It also takes experience, and that is the quality that the rebels lack.
The rebels are hurt by their lack of organization, by their inability to coordinate. Rebel thrusts that meet opposition seem to get bogged down. Nobody seems to be in charge to execute the fire and maneuver plans so beloved of America's Keep It Simple, Stupid school of philosophy. Groups of rebels race around aimlessly. Reinforcements group together and set out on their own, or sometimes not at all. Out of thousands of rebel fighters (with reports of more showing up all the time), only a few hundred ever seem to be at the crucial points, and nobody knows where the rest are.
Additionally the rebels are being hurt by their inability to use what they have. We know that they have captured artillery pieces of their own, including what appeared to be on first examination a towed 107mm rocket launcher. But using artillery takes practice and training, as well as continual communication with some sort of forward observer to make it effective. The employment of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) launchers, is even harder, requiring not only trained missile operators, but trained radar operators as well. We know that the rebels have taken SAM positions in eastern Libya, SAMs that would be effective at virtually grounding Gaddafi's Air Force, and we can only speculate that they lack the trained personnel to use them.
In their favor, the rebel column is sort of slim. World public opinion is on their side, but so far this has failed to provide tangible benefits. It might prevent wholesale slaughter of Benghazi for fear of western retaliation, but it has not yet provided a single bomb, a single plane, or a single tank to their cause. Their hope will be to leverage it into full-scale aid, or at least to hamper Gaddafi's high-tech advantage.
More importantly for the rebels is time. They need to hang on. Every day they hang on their soldiers learn a little, they learn how to survive air raids, how to conserve ammunition, when to fire at enemies and when not to. By process of attrition they learn the best ways to move to avoid snipers, and the best ways to survive artillery barrages. They began to develop command structures, capable of massing reserve units to prevent breakthroughs, or maintaining order in the chaos. In the street of Tobruk and Benghazi they buy time for more recruits to train, to learn how to fire rifles, how to maneuver under fire. Every hour of valuable experience turns the rebel army into something closer to the real thing. It's an incredibly valuable advantage to have, because each hour you can buy means that the next hour you buy will be cheaper.
Additionally, time gives them the chance to make use of their diplomatic advantage. The longer they can hold out, the more they can look like a real government. The more the chance they can use any oil facilities in their control (especially if they hang onto Brega) to sell oil for money, and then find some way to exchange money for more weapons. The more time they have to establish the popular base of support they'll need to take the war to its end. If they can just hang on long enough, Gaddafi will have to accept stalemate.
Or that's the hope. It remains to be seen if they have the time.
The World Watches
That's about all it does. Russia's already threatened to veto a No-Fly Zone in the UN Security Council. China hasn't decided yet. The Arab League and the African Union haven't come up with any plans that are more then fanciful fairy tales. And nobody in NATO seems eager to pony up the billion dollars that such an operation would cost.
One shouldn't beat around the bush here either. Only the loyalists have planes. Creating a no-fly zone is tantamount to declaring war on Gaddafi. I'm not saying that's a bad idea (although I don't think it's a good idea – yet), but people shouldn't delude themselves into thinking of this as a “peaceful” operation. Shooting down Libyan planes over Libyan territory (in a civil war, both sides can be said to represent Libya) is an act of war, and coming in on the side of the rebels will have consequences.
It also can't be said that this will have a decisive effect. Gaddafi would still be left with his artillery, with his tanks, and in some plans, with his helicopters (low-flying aircraft are difficult to detect). If we want to ensure a rebel victory (or at the least, rebel survival) this means sending troops in on the ground. It could be something light, like the US operations in Afghanistan that overthrew the Taliban, but it is a very real commitment. And with nobody having any idea of who would replace Gaddafi, it remains an operation the US does not with to undertake.
Nero fiddled while Rome burned. We at least have the decency not to fiddle, but the side effect is the same, while we try to figure out who is on fire, and who were the arsonists.