Myths of Syria
Sep. 5th, 2013 08:49 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
There are a lot of myths flying around about Syria, from both sides, which annoys me. Everyone seems to believe things that I find false. I’m not an expert, but even I get annoyed by some of the myths I’ve seen floating around. Here are some I find especially false:
The Regime Ordered the Use of Chemical Weapons: Well, how do we know this? Sure, I don’t find the idea that the rebels stole chemical weapons from the regime and then unleashed them on their own forces to be a bit farfetched, but there’s no good public evidence yet that the regime itself ordered the attacks. It presumes a level of organization and cohesiveness that, so far, the government hasn’t demonstrated. Who ordered the attacks, the general in charge of the theater? The president? The commander of the chemical warfare unit? Or maybe just the guy who happened to be carting those things around in his truck at the time. This doesn’t exempt the Syrian regime from collective retaliation, after all the buck stops at the top, but it does mean that we should make sure that we at least get the person who ordered the attacks.
The US intervention will have to use ground troops: I don’t believe this is necessary, I don’t even believe it’s necessary. In the only intervention that Obama has orchestrated so far by himself, in Libya, he hasn’t committed ground troops (except for one SAR mission that I know of). There’s precedent for committing air attacks only, a precedent that was also embraced by Clinton’s foreign policy junta. If the issue is that the Syria used chemical weapons once then there’s no good reason for the US to put ground troops down. Obama doesn’t want to take the domestic flak, and the Joint Chiefs actively hate the idea of a politically limited war. The offensive will probably consist mostly of cruise missile fire from US Navy vessels offshore, with some missions given to the Air Force to give them something to do. They might not even fly planes over Syria if they can help it.
If we intervene, we’re taking sides: We’ve already taken sides. Don’t think that this professed neutrality of ours fools anybody. To the rest of the world we’ve announced our intention not to support Assad, and don’t think the rest of the world is going to forget that. For those in Syria, well, anyone who isn’t their friend is at best a useful tool, and not to be trusted. By refusing to openly sell weapons to any of the parties, and refusing to back any of the sides militarily, we’ve already “interfered” by most people’s judgment. There’s no such things as neutrality here. When you have the ability to intervene any decision you make, including the decision not to make a decision, is itself interfering in the conflict. We can try to minimize the damage, but we can’t reverse it.
Without intervening the government will win the war: Uh-huh. The same government that, despite the fact the rebels are about as disorganized as a set of bowling pins run over by a bulldozer, with the assistance of thousands of extra troops and Hezbollah itself, hasn’t been able to reclaim even a substantial portion of the territory it lost. The same army that, despite massive advantages in armored vehicles, artillery, and mobility, not to mention complete control of the air, has managed to launch a single successful major offensive against the rebels, and that with the help of Hezbollah. And somehow, now that they’ve figured out to more effectively kill unarmed civilians a little more efficiently they’re going to bring the war to a conclusion? To say I’m dubious would probably be an understatement.
A single strike will allow the Free Syrian Army to win and establish a new democratic government: ROFLMAO. Putting aside my doubts about the FSA’s actual democratic leanings, lets talk capability. Given the low morale and capabilities of the military, the FSA could already have won the war with the right leadership and training. They haven’t, and that’s not necessarily because they aren’t trying. In part it’s because of the incredible disorganization of the FSA and the ongoing fights with other rebel groups. But it’s also tightly tied to the fact that overthrowing the regime, while convenient, is not the end goal of most of the FSA factions. This is a very local civil war, in the sense that its politics and motivations seem to be local. The various towns, cities, and regions don’t necessarily want a democratic Syria, they want more autonomy for them, and nuts to handing that over to some new government. A powerful, united Syria is not in very many people's cards. If the US wanted the rebels to win outright we would have to do most of the legwork. They’d be happy with us doing that, but it doesn’t seem to be a good use of our resources.
If we support the rebels, they’ll love us: I’m surprised that this one is still implicit in many of our dealings because it’s been so seriously disproven. Remember the mujahideen that we supported in Afghanistan in the 80s? Whatever happened to them? Hint: They became the Taliban. How about all those various right-wing groups in Central and South America that we once backed, and that are now engaged in the drug trade? How did that turn out? Even when it turns out well, the US still complains. Ideologically, France is the country that most closely mirrors our foreign policy, partly as a result of the aid we provided during the Second World War, but we still complain about them. Remember, the sides are using us to get what they want, and they know we’re using them. They aren’t stupid. It’s a business relationship, and once it’s done they’ll cut deals with whoever offers them the best price.
If we support a side and they lose, the winners will hate us forever: I find this unlikely. They may hate us, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they won’t work with us. Consider our strongest ally in Southeast Asia right now, a title that might very well belong to the People’s Republic of Vietnam. Yeah, we fought a war with Vietnam, yeah a whole bunch of people in charge of Vietnam had friends and relatives killed by Americans, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t cut a deal with us. It’s upped the price, but after all these years, confronted with the influence of China, Vietnam is only too willing to deal with the US. Russia, despite decades of Cold War animosity, is willing to support the US on counter-terrorism. Even Venezuela is willing to sell us oil. Just because we fought a war against someone doesn’t mean that they won’t go along with the US when it’s in their interests. It may mean that we have to sweeten the pot, but we shouldn’t try to make sure that our candidate wins now just to prevent future complications. It turns out that in the long run, everyone tends to forgive even before they forget.
US intervention will have a major impact on the Syrian Civil War: This is probably the biggest, and most frustrating myth I’ve seen. There’s this persistent idea that because the US is doing the intervening, and the US is a big country, something big will happen. The Syrian Civil War is immense. It has killed over a hundred thousand people. People have lost friends, family, lovers, children. Does anyone seriously think that just because the US decides to drop a few dozen cruise missiles on a few widely spaced targets they're going to forget about that? Those people have a reason to fight each other, and they’re going to keep on doing it, no matter what the US, or France, or Russia decides to do about it. Yes, there will be a lot written about foreign intervention in future books on the topic, but the truth is that anything the US does at the scale the US can operate on will have minimal effects on Syria. So maybe a military strike will discourage the regime from using more chemical weapons, or maybe it will hand Assad an advantage, but either way tens of thousands of people are still going to die. The war will continue. So above all else, let’s not embrace delusions of grandeur.
Some people believe that we should try to prevent the use of chemical weapons against civilians (for good reason), and that the only way to discourage regimes like Syria from doing so is by executing military strikes against regime targets because anything else is ineffective (there’s good reason to believe this too). Others point out that the situation in Syria is murky at best (true), that there are other ways to prevent a repeat of chemical strikes without military attacks on Syria (a reasonable position), and that the mitigation potential of air strikes will not counterbalance the loss of civilian life to inevitable collateral damage (also reasonable). Others point out that Syria is not our affair, and that we should not get involved as a matter of principle (another valid position). But all those people should recognize that, whatever we choose to do in Syria, it’s not going to change the game. The game is long, the game is bloody, and we’re little more than a bit player. So let’s not harbor delusions that we’re going to be able to control the course of the war and base our decision on an understanding of how minimal an impact what we say we’re planning will be.
The Regime Ordered the Use of Chemical Weapons: Well, how do we know this? Sure, I don’t find the idea that the rebels stole chemical weapons from the regime and then unleashed them on their own forces to be a bit farfetched, but there’s no good public evidence yet that the regime itself ordered the attacks. It presumes a level of organization and cohesiveness that, so far, the government hasn’t demonstrated. Who ordered the attacks, the general in charge of the theater? The president? The commander of the chemical warfare unit? Or maybe just the guy who happened to be carting those things around in his truck at the time. This doesn’t exempt the Syrian regime from collective retaliation, after all the buck stops at the top, but it does mean that we should make sure that we at least get the person who ordered the attacks.
The US intervention will have to use ground troops: I don’t believe this is necessary, I don’t even believe it’s necessary. In the only intervention that Obama has orchestrated so far by himself, in Libya, he hasn’t committed ground troops (except for one SAR mission that I know of). There’s precedent for committing air attacks only, a precedent that was also embraced by Clinton’s foreign policy junta. If the issue is that the Syria used chemical weapons once then there’s no good reason for the US to put ground troops down. Obama doesn’t want to take the domestic flak, and the Joint Chiefs actively hate the idea of a politically limited war. The offensive will probably consist mostly of cruise missile fire from US Navy vessels offshore, with some missions given to the Air Force to give them something to do. They might not even fly planes over Syria if they can help it.
If we intervene, we’re taking sides: We’ve already taken sides. Don’t think that this professed neutrality of ours fools anybody. To the rest of the world we’ve announced our intention not to support Assad, and don’t think the rest of the world is going to forget that. For those in Syria, well, anyone who isn’t their friend is at best a useful tool, and not to be trusted. By refusing to openly sell weapons to any of the parties, and refusing to back any of the sides militarily, we’ve already “interfered” by most people’s judgment. There’s no such things as neutrality here. When you have the ability to intervene any decision you make, including the decision not to make a decision, is itself interfering in the conflict. We can try to minimize the damage, but we can’t reverse it.
Without intervening the government will win the war: Uh-huh. The same government that, despite the fact the rebels are about as disorganized as a set of bowling pins run over by a bulldozer, with the assistance of thousands of extra troops and Hezbollah itself, hasn’t been able to reclaim even a substantial portion of the territory it lost. The same army that, despite massive advantages in armored vehicles, artillery, and mobility, not to mention complete control of the air, has managed to launch a single successful major offensive against the rebels, and that with the help of Hezbollah. And somehow, now that they’ve figured out to more effectively kill unarmed civilians a little more efficiently they’re going to bring the war to a conclusion? To say I’m dubious would probably be an understatement.
A single strike will allow the Free Syrian Army to win and establish a new democratic government: ROFLMAO. Putting aside my doubts about the FSA’s actual democratic leanings, lets talk capability. Given the low morale and capabilities of the military, the FSA could already have won the war with the right leadership and training. They haven’t, and that’s not necessarily because they aren’t trying. In part it’s because of the incredible disorganization of the FSA and the ongoing fights with other rebel groups. But it’s also tightly tied to the fact that overthrowing the regime, while convenient, is not the end goal of most of the FSA factions. This is a very local civil war, in the sense that its politics and motivations seem to be local. The various towns, cities, and regions don’t necessarily want a democratic Syria, they want more autonomy for them, and nuts to handing that over to some new government. A powerful, united Syria is not in very many people's cards. If the US wanted the rebels to win outright we would have to do most of the legwork. They’d be happy with us doing that, but it doesn’t seem to be a good use of our resources.
If we support the rebels, they’ll love us: I’m surprised that this one is still implicit in many of our dealings because it’s been so seriously disproven. Remember the mujahideen that we supported in Afghanistan in the 80s? Whatever happened to them? Hint: They became the Taliban. How about all those various right-wing groups in Central and South America that we once backed, and that are now engaged in the drug trade? How did that turn out? Even when it turns out well, the US still complains. Ideologically, France is the country that most closely mirrors our foreign policy, partly as a result of the aid we provided during the Second World War, but we still complain about them. Remember, the sides are using us to get what they want, and they know we’re using them. They aren’t stupid. It’s a business relationship, and once it’s done they’ll cut deals with whoever offers them the best price.
If we support a side and they lose, the winners will hate us forever: I find this unlikely. They may hate us, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they won’t work with us. Consider our strongest ally in Southeast Asia right now, a title that might very well belong to the People’s Republic of Vietnam. Yeah, we fought a war with Vietnam, yeah a whole bunch of people in charge of Vietnam had friends and relatives killed by Americans, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t cut a deal with us. It’s upped the price, but after all these years, confronted with the influence of China, Vietnam is only too willing to deal with the US. Russia, despite decades of Cold War animosity, is willing to support the US on counter-terrorism. Even Venezuela is willing to sell us oil. Just because we fought a war against someone doesn’t mean that they won’t go along with the US when it’s in their interests. It may mean that we have to sweeten the pot, but we shouldn’t try to make sure that our candidate wins now just to prevent future complications. It turns out that in the long run, everyone tends to forgive even before they forget.
US intervention will have a major impact on the Syrian Civil War: This is probably the biggest, and most frustrating myth I’ve seen. There’s this persistent idea that because the US is doing the intervening, and the US is a big country, something big will happen. The Syrian Civil War is immense. It has killed over a hundred thousand people. People have lost friends, family, lovers, children. Does anyone seriously think that just because the US decides to drop a few dozen cruise missiles on a few widely spaced targets they're going to forget about that? Those people have a reason to fight each other, and they’re going to keep on doing it, no matter what the US, or France, or Russia decides to do about it. Yes, there will be a lot written about foreign intervention in future books on the topic, but the truth is that anything the US does at the scale the US can operate on will have minimal effects on Syria. So maybe a military strike will discourage the regime from using more chemical weapons, or maybe it will hand Assad an advantage, but either way tens of thousands of people are still going to die. The war will continue. So above all else, let’s not embrace delusions of grandeur.
Some people believe that we should try to prevent the use of chemical weapons against civilians (for good reason), and that the only way to discourage regimes like Syria from doing so is by executing military strikes against regime targets because anything else is ineffective (there’s good reason to believe this too). Others point out that the situation in Syria is murky at best (true), that there are other ways to prevent a repeat of chemical strikes without military attacks on Syria (a reasonable position), and that the mitigation potential of air strikes will not counterbalance the loss of civilian life to inevitable collateral damage (also reasonable). Others point out that Syria is not our affair, and that we should not get involved as a matter of principle (another valid position). But all those people should recognize that, whatever we choose to do in Syria, it’s not going to change the game. The game is long, the game is bloody, and we’re little more than a bit player. So let’s not harbor delusions that we’re going to be able to control the course of the war and base our decision on an understanding of how minimal an impact what we say we’re planning will be.